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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS-RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS-SECTION 402A-PENNSYLVANIA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION 2725-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

has held that plaintiffs claiming personal injury damages caused by
allegedly defective products may proceed in trespass, using the tort
statute of limitations, or in assumpsit, using the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code statute of limitations.
Williams v. West Penn Power Co.,

-

Pa.

-,

467 A.2d 811

(1983).*
On May 19, 1975 Gerald Williams and his employer, Daniel
Banks, were lowering a ladder platform hoist when it contacted a
high tension power line.1 Williams and Banks were both severely
burned; the former lost two toes on his right foot and the latter
had his left leg amputated below the knee.' The ladder, which was
allegedly defective in construction and design, was manufactured
by Reimann and Georger, Inc., sold by Commercial Services Company and purchased by B & M Roofing Contractors.3
A praecipe for a writ of summons in trespass was filed by Williams and Banks on May 20, 1977 in the Allegheny County Court
of Common Pleas.4 On June 29, 1977 a complaint in trespass and
assumpsit was filed in the same court.5 The plaintiffs' complaint in
assumpsit was filed under the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial
Code which provides a four-year statute of limitations." In respon* Due to the unavailability of the Williams opinion in the Pennsylvania State Reports
at this time, citations to this reporter have been omitted.
1. Williams v. West Penn Power Co., 467 A.2d 811, 813 (Pa. 1983). The complaint did
not allege the date of the ladder's purchase, but the brief of Reimann and Georger, Inc.
indicated that the injuries were sustained on "the same day the ladder was purchased." Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. Only Commercial Services Company and Reimann and Georger, Inc. were respondents in this appeal. Id. at 814. The defendants initially included Jerry Lee Milbee
individually and as partner in B & M Roofing Contractors, West Penn Power (owner of the
power lines), Slovenian Hall Association (owner of the building upon which Williams and
Banks were working) and Bahr Brothers (the contractor that subcontracted the roofing to B
& M Roofing). The dismissal of these defendants, however, was not questioned on appeal.
Id. at n.9.
4. 467 A.2d at 813.
5. Id.
6. Id. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1101-2725 (1979) (repealing and reincorporating the Act
of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3 as Title 13, Act of November 1, 1979, P.L. 255, No. 86) (formerly 12A
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-101 to 2-275 (Purdon 1953)). The present § 2314 and § 2315

280

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:279

sive pleadings, the defendants asserted the two-year tort statute of
limitations7 and were granted summary judgments upon the authority of Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co. (Salvador II), 5
which had applied the two-year tort statute of limitations to all
breach of warranty actions where the damages claimed are for personal injury. 9
On appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court it was held that
Williams, as a non-purchasing employee lacking horizontal privity,
should be denied the benefit of the four-year statute of limitations
provided in the Code.' 0 The court also held that Banks and his
wife could not proceed against the manufacturers but that they
could proceed against the seller because they were in vertical privity with the latter but not the former." All parties appealed these
decisions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court."
Justice Nix,'8 writing for a unanimous court, first noted that the
complaints were already time-barred under Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A (1966). 1' The court then stated that the requireprovide implied warranties and § 2318 extends these warranties to third party beneficiaries.
The present § 2725(a) provides a four-year statute of limitations in contracts for sale. The
present sections were merely renumbered and not substantively changed when reincorporated. Therefore, all citations to the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code are to the
present sections.
7. 467 A.2d at 813. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524(2) (Purdon 1983) restricts all
actions in trespass to a two-year statute of limitations. Id.
8. 256 Pa. Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978), aff'd per curiam, 492 Pa. 258, 424 A.2d
497 (1981). Salvador II held that the statute of limitations for breach of warranty on sales
of products does not apply to third party personal injuries arising from defective products
and that the two-year tort statute of limitations should be uniformly applied to all actions
claiming personal injuries. 256 Pa. Super. at 335, 389 A.2d at 1151.
9. 467 A.2d at 813.
10. Id. For an explanation of vertical and horizontal privity in their products liability
context, see Note, Products Liability: Employees and the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-318, 68 DICK. L. REv. 444, 446 (1964), which provides the following summarization:
Vertical privity exists where the actual purchaser proceeds against his remote vendor.
His direction of suit is upward, through the series of sales which culminated in his
purchase. Horizontal privity, on the other hand, begins with the user of the product
and ends with the ultimate purchaser. The user's movement is across as he attempts
to reach the legal position occupied by the purchaser.
Id.
11. 467 A.2d at 813. Banks was a partner in B & M Roofing Contrators for whom
Williams worked. As a partner, Banks was a purchaser of the ladder and this placed him in
vertical privity with the seller, but not the manufacturer. Williams, as an employee, did not
have either vertical or horizontal privity, thus creating the privity issue of his complaint. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 812. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott,
Hutchinson and Zappala participated. Justice Nix delivered the opinion of the court and
Justice Larsen concurred in the result without opinion. Id.
14. Id. at 814. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) [hereinafter Re-
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ment of privity of contract as applied by the superior court was no
longer the law in Pennsylvania. 5 The court concluded that either
the two-year tort statute of limitations or the four-year Code statute of limitations may be applied to all breaches of warranty, including those resulting in claims of personal injury, thus giving
plaintiffs the option of proceeding in trespass or assumpsit.'6
In reaching this conclusion concerning the requirement of privity
in actions of breach of warranty, Justice Nix first explained that
earlier cases adhered to the concept because the action, which had
originally been in tort, was gradually replaced by one in contract,
giving rise to the defense of lack of privity. 17 Second, the Justice
indicated that at the time of the adoption of the Code,"' case law
in Pennsylvania had held that such actions "were limited to the
immediate or original buyer in reliance upon the rule of privity of
contract."19 Third, Justice Nix explained that while the Code extended this cause of action to members of the buyer's family,
Pennsylvania continued to hold to the requirement of horizontal
privity where employees were concerned.2 0 Justice Nix then stated
statement], which provides as follows:
Topic 5. Smjc'r Li mnrry
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. § 402A was adopted into the tort law of Pennsylvania in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220
A.2d 853 (1966).
15. Id. at 815-16. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co. (SalvadorI), 457 Pa. 24, 30,
319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974) (removing the requirement of horizontal privity).See also Kassab
v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 234, 246 A.2d 848, 854 (1968) (abolishing the requirement of
vertical privity).
16. 467 A.2d at 818.
17. Id. at 814.
18. Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the Uniform Commercial Code, having
done so in 1953. Id. at n.7.
19. Id. at 814. See Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 162, 63 A.2d 24, 26 (1949) (restricting
actions to those by an immediate or original buyer in reliance on the rule of privity).
20. 467 A.2d at 815. See Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 614, 187 A.2d
575, 577 (1963). Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co. (Salvador1), 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903
(1974), overruled Hochgertel and removed the requirement of horizontal privity. 457 Pa. at
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that present authorities deem both horizontal and vertical privity
"undesirable" because they insulate the manufacturer from suit
and bar non-buyers who are in fact injured by defective products
sold through mass scale marketing practices."1 In addition, he indicated that privity had been judicially removed from products liability cases. 2
Justice Nix stated that once Pennsylvania adopted the Restatement, it logically followed that vertical privity would fall in products liability cases.2 3 Moreover, he agreed with the reasoning in
Salvador I where the court relied on Dean Prosser's conclusion
that warranty needs no contract to arise as a matter of tort and,
therefore, can exist between parties who have not engaged in an
arm's length transaction. 4 Accordingly, Justice Nix concluded that
this logic eliminated horizontal privity. 25 In conclusion, the court
found that case law had abolished privity for the same reasons that
the Code had eliminated it for the buyer's family: privity maintains an anomalous tort/contract dichotomy that results in a legal
asymmetry allowing purchasers to recover when other injured par26
ties may not.
Finally, Justice Nix addressed the problems caused by the statute of limitations dispute, stating that this had caused the reappearance of privity and caused further asymmetry.27 He observed
that the attempt to create symmetry between the Restatement and
33, 319 A.2d at 908. See also Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa.424, 425, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (1966) (making the manufacturer the guarantor of his products). See also Kassab v. Central Soya, 432
Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968), where the court held that the remote manufacturer may be
sued, that vertical privity was abolished under the Code, and that the Code should be coextensive with § 402A. 432 Pa. at 234, 246 A.2d at 856. The court in Kassab concluded that
this would eliminate confusion as to what type of suit should be brought and prevent the
action from being decided according to its label. Id. at 226, 246 A.2d at 852.
21. 467 A.2d at 815 & n.14.
22. Id. (citing Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)).
Henningsen held that where a manufacturer places the product into the "stream of trade
and promotes its purchase", an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use extends to the purchaser and that the absence of agency between the manufacturer and the
dealer (seller) is immaterial. 32 N.J. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
23. 467 A.2d at 815. See Kassab, 432 Pa. at 226, 246 A.2d at 852.
24. 467 A.2d at 816 (citing Salvador I, 224 Pa. Super. at 386, 307 A.2d at 403). See
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J.
1099, 1127 (1960) ("[i]f warranty is a matter of tort as well as contract, and if it can arise
without any intent to make it a matter of contract, then it should need no contract; and it
may arise and exist between parties who have not dealt with one another."). See also supra
note 20.
25. 467 A.2d at 816.
26. Id. at 817.
27. Id.
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the Code had resulted in a decision that the two-year tort statute
of limitations should be applied where plaintiffs are injured
through breach of implied warranty in products liability actions
under the Code. 28 But Justice Nix concluded that this attempt was

unsuccessful in that even though plaintiffs may be injured in the
same accident, they could not have the same relief as that afforded
to a direct purchaser.29
In disapproving the holding in Salvador II, Justice Nix maintained that complaints in breach of warranty-products liability actually sound in both tort and contract; therefore, the mere fact
that the claim is for personal injury should not preclude the use of
the Code statute of limitations."0 Furthermore, he claimed that
privity should be abandoned because even the Code does not require it.3'
As a result of this analysis, the court held that plaintiffs claiming
personal injuries in products liability actions due to breaches of
implied warranties have the option of proceeding in trespass or assumpsit and that the four-year statute of limitations is applicable
to products liability actions under the Code. 2
The issue raised in Williams concerns the statute of limitations
applicable to actions for personal injury based upon claims in
products liability-breach of warranty. Specifically, the issue involves which statute of limitations is to apply to these actions, the
two-year tort period, the four-year Code period, or both.33 This
28. Id. See generally Salvador II, 256 Pa. Super. 330, 389 A.2d 1148 (1978).
29. 467 A.2d at 817-18.
30. Id. Salvador II had held that referring to these as contract actions was merely a
fiction and that since the action sounds in tort, the tort statute of limitations should apply.
256 Pa. Super. at 341, 389 A.2d at 1154.
31. 467 A.2d at 817.
32. Id. at 818. The superior court's affirmations of the summary judgments for the
seller and manufacturer against Williams and that of the manufacturer against Banks and
his wife was reversed. The denial of summary judgment against the seller in favor of Banks
and his wife was affirmed. The case was then remanded to the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas. Id.
33. The privity issue raised in Williams appears to be well settled because of longstanding and unquestioned precedents in this Commonwealth and other jurisdictions. See
supra notes 20, 22-24 and accompanying text. Justice Nix addressed the question in Williams because "the confusion resulting from the tort/contract dichotomy was resurrected
and exacerbated by the dispute as to the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied in
actions under the Code for breach of warranty for personal injury." 467 A.2d at 817. Both
the precedents cited and Justice Nix's rationale lead to the inevitable conclusion that there
is no requirement of any type of privity in products liability actions in Pennsylvania,
whether brought under trespass or assumpsit. See supra notes 20, 22-24 and accompanying
text. Therefore, this issue need not be further addressed.
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problem is actually a matter of three separate issues. First,
whether the Code is to be applied at all to such actions. Second,
whether products liability-breach of warranty claims actually
sound in both trespass and assumpsit, as suggested in Williams.
Third, whether there is a further problem created by the Williams
holding that plaintiffs have the option of using either the tort or
contract theory.
The question of whether the Code statute of limitations should
be applied to tort cases which have breach of warranty implications has produced irreconciliable decisions in Pennsylvania. A
pre-Code case, decided under the Uniform Sales Act, 4 followed
the rule that personal injury claims were barred if brought beyond
the two-year tort statute of limitations.3 5 Another pre-Code case
also required that plaintiffs establish the existence of a sale or contract in order to bring an action in assumpsit, effectively precluding the use of the contract statute of limitations absent a showing
of privity.3 6 This rule persisted until after the adoption of the
Code, at which point the conflict between tort and contract became
critical because the Code provided for personal injury as a form of
consequential damage,3 7 thus producing alternative remedies and
forcing the courts to decide between the opposing theories of
action.
One of the post-Code cases held that the tort statute of limitations was superseded by the Code in the field of breach of implied
warranty.38 Others followed the Code statute of limitations but re34. The Act of March 27, 1713, 1 Sm. L. 76, § 1, repealed by Act of April 28, 1978,
P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a)(9) was applied by the Pennsylvania courts when the Uniform Sales
Act was in effect because there was no statute of limitations in the sections of the Uniform
Sales Act which were adopted in Pennsylvania. This Act was formerly codified at 12 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 31 (Purdon 1953), and provided a six-year statute of limitations. When
the Code was adopted by Pennsylvania, all contract actions were governed by the four-year
statute of limitations found in 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2725(a) (1979) (repealingand reincorporating the Act of April 6, 1953, P.L. 3 as Title 13, Act of November 1, 1979, P.L. 255, No.
86 formerly 12A PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2-725(a) (Purdon 1953))).
35. See Jones v. Boggs & Buhl, Inc., 355 Pa. 242, 49 A.2d 379 (1946). The Jones court
stated that the purpose of the Uniform Sales Act-control over sales contracts-would be
avoided by allowing personal injury suits in assumpsit. Id.
36. See Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
37. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2715(b)(2) (1979) (repealing and reincorporatingthe Act of
April 6, 1953, P.L. 3 as Title 13, Act of November 1, 1979, P.L. 255, No. 86 formerly 12A PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2-715(b)(2) (Purdon 1953)).
38. See Engleman v. Eastern Light Co., Inc., 30 Pa. D. & C.2d 38 (1962). This Carbon
County Court of Common Pleas case is often cited by the federal district courts in Pennsylvania, evidence of the paucity of authority on this subject in the Commonwealth. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1978), citing Engleman for
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fused to extend it to employees, or limited it strictly to purchasers,
because the Code only prescribed its limitations period for certain
third part beneficiaries.3 9 The courts allowed actions for personal
injuries, but only when the action involved a suit by a buyer
against a seller, that is, when no third parties were involved. 40 Indeed, one case held that recovery of damages for wrongful death
could only be had in trespass since the duty of care was one imposed by law as opposed to contract.41
The situation was further complicated after the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court adopted § 402A of the Restatement.42 In an effort
to reconcile the strict liability theory of the Restatement with the
contract theory of the Code, the frequently cited case of Kassab v.
Central Soya4 8 not only removed privity but also reflected a philosophy which is still followed. That philosophy was one of not allowing "the caption atop the plaintiff's complaint" to determine
the resolution of "identical controversies . The philosophical
purpose as stated in Kassab was to achieve legal symmetry between the laws of tort and contract by application of the proper
theory of recovery regardless of the label on the complaint. 4" Further, the Kassab court viewed the area of products liability as an
extension of a remedy through social policy. The court concluded
that this social policy was designed to protect typical consumers
and to prevent manufacturers from being insulated from suit by
the intervening sales of retail merchants. 46 Salvador I used removal of privity, reluctance to decide cases according to their labels and consumer protection social policy to extend the cause of
action under the Code to virtually all users of the product. 47 Howthe proposition that the Code statute of limitations should be applied to all breach of warranty actions. 450 F. Supp. at 428.
39. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2318 (1979) extends the warranty to the buyer's family and
his guests who would reasonably be expected to use the product. See, e.g., Hochgertel v.
Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963) (holding that an implied warranty does
not extend to an employee); Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383, 221 A.2d 320 (1966) (requiring
non-purchasers to be within the language of § 2318 in order to receive an extension of the
implied warranty).
40. See, e.g., Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965); Gardiner
v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964).
41. DiBelardino v. Lemmon Pharmacal Co., 416 Pa. 580, 208 A.2d 283 (1965).
42. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966) (adopting § 402A as the law in
Pennsylvania). See also supra note 14.
43. 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968).
44. Id. at 226, 246 A.2d at 853.

45. Id.
46.
47.

Id.
457 Pa. at 30, 319 A.2d at 907.
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ever, this further blurred the distinction between an action in tort
and one in contract, and between the distinct statutes of limitation
that are provided for each.
Between the Kassab and Salvador I decisions, there was a vacuous period during which there was little development of the statute
of limitations quandry in Pennsylvania products liability law. To
this point, the law had removed privity and allowed products liability actions to be brought under the Code, but there had been no
decision concerning the statute of limitations or when it would begin to run. Dean Murray, in considering this lack of development,
suggested two reasons why the Code statute of limitations should
not be applied to products liability suits by non-purchasers claiming personal injuries.48 First, in a literal interpretation of § 2725,"9
he observed that personal injuries are not mentioned in the section
and that the section explicitly states that the four-year period begins upon tender of delivery (this being when the breach of warranty occurs, if at all). 50 He concluded that this meant that the
Code would only be involved when the legal relationship which existed was between buyer and seller.51 Second, Dean Murray advanced the notion that the Code might deny many individuals a
remedy because the Code period could expire before a plaintiff was
52
actually injured by the product.

During this time, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not have
occasion to decide the issue of the statute of limitations. However,
the federal district courts in Pennsylvania did address the question. One interpreted Pennsylvania law to impose the two-year
statute of limitations on actions for personal injury whether such
actions sounded in assumpsit or in trespass, and whether brought
under a negligence or a strict liability theory.53 The same court
48. Murray, Products Liability - Another Word, 35 U. PiTT. L. REV. 255 (1973).
49. Id. at 267. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2725(a)(b) (1979) states, in pertinent part:
(a) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has occurred. ...
(b) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs. . . . A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made. ...

Id.
50. Murray, supra note 48, at 267.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 269 (citing Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 305
N.Y.S.2d 490, 253 N.E.2d 207 (1969)). Mendel was overruled in Victorson v. Bock Laundry
Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 373 N.Y.S.2d 39, 335 N.E.2d 275 (1975), thus obviating the situation where the Code period expires before a plaintiff is actually injured.
53. Peeke v. Penn Central Transportation Co., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 70, 74 (E.D. Pa.
1975), afl'd, 538 F.2d 318 (1976).

1984

Recent Decisions

also held that this statute of limitations began to run at the time
of tender of delivery, but, the court refused to conclude that Salvador I had created a new, hybrid statute of limitations beginning to
run at the time of injury while also allowing the four-year Code
period. 4 In a later case, the same court flatly refused to apply the
Code because there was no buyer-seller relationship. 5 Moreover, in
a third case, the third circuit rejected the use of the Code statute
of limitations and noted a trend in Pennsylvania toward viewing
non-purchaser actions filed under the Code as strict liability actions in tort, rather than as contract actions.5 6 This court concluded that products liability law protected consumers as a matter
of social policy and that such social policy was intended to insulate
a manufacturer from suit after two years.57
When Salvador II was decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, the development of the law predicted in the federal district
courts was confirmed. The Salvador II court held that the fouryear Code statute of limitations should not be applied to third
party personal injuries arising from defective products, holding instead that the two-year tort statute of limitations should be uniformly applied to such actions, with the period beginning on the
date of injury. 58 The court felt that the Kassab goal of legal symmetry required the use of the tort statute of limitations because
strict liability in the contractual context was merely a fiction created to reach a desirable social policy, and thus claimed that the
theory of such claims actually sounds in tort.5 9 The reasons ad-

vanced for this were those of Dean Murray: the language of the
Code does not apply to personal injury-products liability actions,
and third parties could be deprived of a remedy if not injured
within the Code period.60 Further, the court distinguished two earlier holdings where buyer-seller relationships existed and where
the Code was the only strict liability remedy available when those
cases were decided.6 1 Salvador II, by utilizing § 402A of the Re54. 403 F. Supp. at 73-74.
55. See Patterson v. Her Majesty Indus., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
56. Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
981 (1981).
57. Id. at 1104, 1105. Hahn relied heavily on Kassab, Salvador I and Dean Murray's
rationale. Id. See supra nn.15, 50-52 and accompanying text.
58. 256 Pa. Super. at 335, 389 A.2d at 1151.
59. Id. at 341, 389 A.2d at 1154.
60. Id. at 343, 389 A.2d at 1155. See supra note 48.
61. 256 Pa. Super. at 338-39, 389 A.2d at 1153 (citing Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas
Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964), as an example of where a buyer-seller relationship
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statement, provided a new, more logical remedy for personal injury
claims in products liability.
While the Williams court is to be commended for recognizing
the fallacy of perpetuating the tort/contract dichotomy, it should
be recognized that simply saying that the dichotomy was removed
did not solve the problem or answer the arguments discussed
above. In light of these arguments, it seems that Pennsylvania
courts and the commentators will view the Williams opinion as
less than conclusive. Further, by allowing both types of actions, the
Williams court has created the additional problem of allowing a
plaintiff an indefinite period of time to proceed against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective product without affording the
manufacturer repose after some reasonable period of time has
elapsed between sale and injury.
According to the Williams holding, plaintiffs now have the "option of proceeding in tort, governed by the tort statute of limitations, or under the Code, governed by the Code statute of limitations. '6 2 Therefore, the court has concluded that products liability
actions actually sound in both trespass and assumpsit. There are
several reasons why this conclusion should not be reached. First,
the present version of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code
has no provision for third party beneficiaries beyond those listed in
§ 2318, which includes only the buyer's family and guests who
would reasonably be expected to use the product.6" Justice Nix extended the warranty to employees by relying on comment three to
§ 2318, the relevant portion of which states that the section "is
neutral ..
and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether seller's warranties, given to the buyer who
resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain."" While
this comment removes the necessity for privity, it seems to be
more related to the resale of a product than to the theory of the
action brought to enforce the provisions of the Code. Further, the
Code's purposes, related entirely to sales contracts, seem to confine
the use of comment three to the law of contracts rather than to
existed, and Rufo v. Bastian-Blessing Co., 417 Pa. 107, 207 A.2d 823 (1965), as a case decided when the Code was the only available strict liability remedy).
62. 467 A.2d at 818.
63. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2318 (1979).
64. 467 A.2d at 818. Justice Nix's reliance on the comments is novel in that they have
not been enacted as part of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code. See 13 PA. CoNs.
STAT. §§ 1101-2725 (1979).
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extend it to a hybridized law of contracts and torts. 5 Second, the
adoption of § 402A of the Restatement seems to indicate that
Pennsylvania is a strict products liability jurisdiction." Dean Prosser commented that with strict liability and § 402A, "warranty...
and with it all idea that the plaintiff's recovery is founded on contract, as well as the statutory provisions" are removed.

7

Since

Pennsylvania has adopted § 402A, it appears logical that warranty
actions under the theory of products liability should be removed
from the area of contract law. Moreover, reliance on Dean Prosser's rationale is warranted in the area of products liability since it
was referred to by Justice Nix in Williams and is often mentioned
in cases interpreting Pennsylvania law. 5 Third, earlier Pennsylvania cases concluded that negligence and warranty were two distinct
theories under which products liability actions could be brought.6 '
There seems to be no reason to depart from this idea and merge
warranty with strict liability.
The Williams court, finally, by allowing the option of trespass or
assumpsit, has created the problem of giving a plaintiff an indefinite period during which he may bring an action against a manufacturer under a products liability theory. The Code establishes70
the time of accrual of the limitations period at tender of delivery.
This period then runs for four years. It is well established, however, that the tort statute of limitations accrues at the time of injury,7' and the Williams court did not discuss whether the two periods should coincide with one another. Thus, while the Williams
65. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(b) (1979). That subsection reads:
(a) Purposes and policies of title.-Underlying purposes and policies of this title are:
(1) To simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions.
(2) To permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.
(3) To make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

Id.
66. See supra note 14.
67. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971) at 658.
68. 467 A.2d at 815 n.14, 816. See, e.g., Salvador I, 224 Pa. Super. at 386, 307 A.2d at
403 (approving Dean Prosser's view that warranty can arise without the benefit of a contract). See also Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1104 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 981 (citing W. PRoSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 93 (3d ed. 1964) at 634-43 for the
differences between strict liability and contract actions).
69. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Joseph Horne Co., 406 Pa. 1, 176 A.2d 648 (1961); Loch v.
Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949); Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa.
559, 28 A.2d 913 (1942).
70. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2725(b) (1979).
71. Salvador II, 256 Pa. Super. at 344, 389 A.2d at 1156.
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decision has solved the problem where a buyer and his employee
were injured in the same accident and within the Code period, the
result is unfair to manufacturers because there can be no repose
for them until actions are filed and decided, regardless of when
their products were sold.7 2 Theoretically, it can be argued that, because of the difference in time of accrual between trespass and assumpsit, the Code has been made useless by Williams unless an
injury occurs within the Code period. Moreover, the Williams
court has ignored the trend in Pennsylvania toward viewing the
extension of products liability as a social policy not only designed
to afford a remedy to consumers but also to allow a manufacturer
repose after two years.7 8 Extending the period of time to an indefinite length is contrary to this policy regardless of whether the twoyear period seems adequate in the area of products liability.
Therefore, a solution other than the option of trespass or assumpsit provided by Williams is necessary. Any choice between
the tort and Code periods could recreate the tort/contract dichotomy, remove the Kassab rationale of not deciding like claims according to their captions and give new vigor to the arguments
raised in earlier cases. Consequently, Pennsylvania should join
other jurisdictions that have separate statutes of limitations for
products liability actions. Tennessee's statute is a good example,
providing that:
Any action against a manufacturer or seller of a product for injury to person
or property caused by its defective or unreasonably dangerous condition
must be brought within. . . six years of the date of injury, in any event the
action must be brought within ten years from the date on which the product
was first purchased for use or consumption, or within one year after the
expiration of the anticipated life of the product, whichever is the shorter. 4

This solution not only protects the consumer but also protects the
manufacturer by considering the date of purchase and the nature
of the product.
The suggested solution cannot be accomplished by judicial interpretation. It involves legislative study and determination of a fair
statute of limitations for all parties who might be involved in a
72.

For example, a buyer and his employee could be injured ten years after the tender

of delivery. At that point, they would have lost the Code period, but a suit would still be
possible twelve years after the product was sold. This would render the Code period entirely
ineffective and expose the manufacturer to liability for an unlimited period of time.
73. See Hahn v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 981 (1981).
74. TENN CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980).
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personal injury claim resulting from use of a defective product. It
should be noted, however, that Williams has probably moved
Pennsylvania in this direction by creating the circumstances in
which the need for such legislation will become obvious and by acknowledging that other legislatures have followed this path. 8
Pennsylvania should adopt a separate statute of limitations for
personal injuries in the field of products liability that will allow a
reasonable period for claims and also allow manufacturers repose
after such reasonable period expires. This would achieve legal symmetry by placing a cause of action in products liability under one
theory, thus eliminating the problems involved in the conflict between the laws of contract and tort.
Leland G. Smith

75. 467 A.2d at 817 n.18. Justice Nix listed sixteeen states which have specific statutes
of limitation for personal injury/products liability actions. Id. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-502
(1984); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982); AmK. STAT. AN. § 34-2803 (1983); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 13-80-127.5 & 13-80-127.6 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (1984); FLA. STAT. §
13-213 (1982); IDAHO CODE § 614.1 (1984-85); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2945 (Callaghan 1984);
MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (1978); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-224 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507D:2 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103(a) (1980).

